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The Empirical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia 
 
Penney Lewis 
  
 
I . Introduction 
Slippery slope arguments appear regularly whenever morally contested social change is 
proposed.1  Such arguments assume that all or some consequences which could possibly flow 
from permitting a particular practice are morally unacceptable. 
Typically, “slippery slope” arguments claim that endorsing some premise, 
doing some action or adopting some policy will lead to some definite 
outcome that is generally judged to be wrong or bad. The “slope” is 
“slippery” because there are claimed to be no plausible halting points 
between the initial commitment to a premise, action, or policy and the 
resultant bad outcome. The desire to avoid such projected future 
consequences provides adequate reasons for not taking the first step.2 
 
Thus the legalization of abortion in limited circumstances is asserted to lead down the 
slippery slope towards abortion on demand3 and even infanticide;4 and the legalization of 
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A. Distinguishing the Empirical from the Logical Argument 
There are many varieties of the slippery slope argument. The distinction encountered most 
frequently is between the logical and empirical forms of argument. James Rachels explains: 
The logical [or conceptual] form of the argument goes like this. Once a 
certain practice is accepted, from a logical point of view we are committed 
to accepting certain other practices as well, since there are no good reasons 
for not going on to accept the additional practices once we have taken the 
all-important first step. But, the argument continues, the additional practices 
are plainly unacceptable, therefore, the first step had better not be taken.... 
Th[e empirical or psychological] form of the argument is very different. It 
claims that once certain practices are accepted, people shall in fact go on to 
accept other, more questionable practices. This is simply a claim about what 
people will do and not a claim about what they are logically committed to.7 
 
The empirical slippery slope argument has the most credibility and is most often used by 
opponents of the legalization of euthanasia or assisted suicide.8   Before beginning the 
analysis of this argument, the next two sections identify the particular argument to be 
addressed and describe its significance in a legal context. 
 
B. Which Slippery Slope Argument? 
This article concentrates on the slippery slope argument most widely employed in the context 
of discussion about the legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide: the legalization of 
voluntary active euthanasia will lead to acceptance of non-voluntary active euthanasia.9  
                                                 
 
 7. J. Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986): at 172–3. See also, Van der Burg, supra note 1, at 43; Williams, 
supra note 1, at 126; Arras, supra note 4, at 288–9; J. Glover, Causing Death and Saving 
Lives (London: Penguin Books, 1977): at 165–8; D. Lamb, Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing 
in Applied Ethics (London: Croom Helm, 1988): at 61; Lode, supra note 1, at 1477, 1483; 
Keown, supra note 3, at 261–2. 
 
 8. On logical slippery slope arguments in the assisted dying context, see P. 
Lewis, Assisted Dying and Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): at 164-9.  
 
 9. Other examples of slippery slope arguments made in this context include the 
fears that legalization will legitimize the horrors of the Nazi genocide; erode the rights of the 
disabled; or promote the idea that only some lives are inherently worthwhile. For an example 
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Another slippery slope argument is sometimes made in this context: the argument that 
legalization of assisted suicide will lead to acceptance of euthanasia.10  This argument, 
however, is of significantly less interest as an empirical proposition.  The historical and 
empirical evidence in the Netherlands does not reflect a move from the legalization of 
assisted suicide to voluntary euthanasia.11  Moreover, other jurisdictions which have legalized 
assisted dying have either included both assisted suicide and euthanasia from the outset (for 
example, the Northern Territory of Australia),12 or have legalized assisted suicide but have 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the latter argument, see R. Sherlock, “Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life Not Worth 
Living: Abraham Lincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 
(1981): 47–65, at 49–50 (arguing that the decision to allow euthanasia requires an answer to 
the question of when a life is not worth living; even to discuss such an answer poses a threat 
to the fundamental principle of equality before the law and the principles derived there from). 
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to Die and The Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis,” William & Mary Law Review 22 (1981): 
327–419, at 398. 
 
 10. For examples of this argument, see supra note 5. 
 
 11. See H. Weyers, “Euthanasia: The Process of Legal Change in the 
Netherlands,” in A. Klijn et al., eds., Regulating Physician-Negotiated Death (Amsterdam: 
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(2001, 95% CI 1.8%-2.5%) based on interviews]). B. D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 
“Euthanasia and other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001,” 
Lancet 362 (2003): 395–9, at Table 1, drawing on P. J. van der Maas et al., “Euthanasia, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, and other Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the 
Netherlands, 1990-1995,” New Engl. J. Med. 335 (1996): 1699–1705; P. J. van der Maas et 
al., “Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life,” Lancet 338 
(1991): 669–74. See also, M. E. Newman, “Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” in A. S. 
Berger and J. Berger, eds., To Die Or Not To Die? Cross-Disciplinary, Cultural and Legal 
Perspectives on The Right to Choose Death (New York: Praeger, 1990): 117–28. 
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shown no signs of legalizing euthanasia (for example, Oregon).13  For this reason, this variant 
of the slippery slope argument will not be discussed. 
 
C. The Legal Significance of the Slippery Slope Argument 
Slippery slope arguments are used extensively in legal contexts.14  Frederick Shauer suggests 
an explanation for this: 
[L]egal decisionmaking concentrates on the future more than does decision 
making in other arenas ... [T]oday’s decisionmakers [are called upon] to 
consider the behavior of others who tomorrow will have to apply or 
interpret today’s decisions. The prevalence of slippery slope arguments in 
law may reflect a societal understanding that proceeding through law rather 
than in some other fashion involves being bound in some important way to 
the past, and responsible in some equally important way to the future.15  
 
 In the assisted dying context, the legal significance of the dispute over the empirical 
slippery slope argument is enormous. In Rodriguez, the 1993 decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada holding that the criminal prohibition against assisted suicide was not 
unconstitutional, the perspective of those critics of Dutch practice who rely on the slippery 
slope argument was accepted unquestioningly by Mr. Justice Sopinka (writing for the 
majority). Without providing sources, Mr. Justice Sopinka wrote: 
Critics of the Dutch approach point to evidence suggesting that involuntary 
active euthanasia (which is not permitted by the guidelines) is being 
practised to an increasing degree. This worrisome trend supports the view 
that a relaxation of the absolute prohibition takes us down “the slippery 
slope.”16 
 
                                                 
 
 13. See Lewis, id. at 150-3. Belgium has explicitly legalized only euthanasia, 
although assisted suicide may be folded into the regulatory regime. See id., at 153-7. 
 
 14. See Lode, supra note 1. 
 
 15. Shauer, supra note 1, at 382–3. 
 
 16. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 603 
(S.C.C.). The case is discussed in Lewis, supra note 8, at 14,  119-22. 
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In 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, the United States Supreme 
Court held similarly that state bans on assisted suicide were indeed constitutional.17  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist relied on an almost identical argument to that of Mr. Justice Sopinka, 
although he did buttress it with sources, citing critics18 whose use of the Dutch experience has 
been heavily criticized by Dutch researchers.19  Chief Justice Rehnquist simply stated that 
                                                 
 
 17. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
(1997), both discussed in Lewis, supra note 8, at 15. 
 
 18. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734–5 (1997), citing C. Gomez, 
Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands (New York: The Free Press, 
1991): at 104–13; H. Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997): at 75–84; Keown, supra note 3, at 289; A report of 
Chairman Charles T. Canady to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, September 1996; Executive 
Summary published as “Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A 
Report to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution,” Issues in Law & Medicine 
14 (1998): 301–24 (heavily reliant on the work of Hendin and Gomez).  
 
 19. See J. Griffiths, A. Bood, and H. Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in the 
Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998): at 23, note 15. The authors’ 
comments on Herbert Hendin (one of the most vociferous critics of the Dutch approach) are 
that his research methods are inadequate, and that his analysis is “so filled with mistakes of 
law, of fact, and of interpretation, mostly tendentious, that it is hard to be charitable and 
regard them as merely negligent.” See also, Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, id., at 217, note 54 
discussing one of the “irresponsible claim[s]” made by Hendin; H. Weyers, Book Review, 
“Herbert Hendin: De Dood als Verleider. Weinig Overtuigende Verwoording van Een 
Bekend Standpunt Tegen Liberalisering van Euthanasie,” (“Herbert Hendin: Death as 
Temptress. An Unconvincing Presentation of a Well-Known Objection to the Liberalization 
of Euthanasia Policy”) Medisch Contact (Medical Contact, Official Journal of the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association) 52 (1997): 173–5; J. Griffiths, Book Review, “Een Amerikaan 
over Euthanasie in Nederland,” (“An American’s View of Euthanasia in the Netherlands – 
Review of C.F. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands, 
1991”) Medisch Contact 48 (1993): 1208–9. Researchers outside of the Netherlands have 
also criticized these critics. See, e.g., J. Downie, “The Contested Lessons of Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands,” Health Law Journal 8 (2000): 119–39, at 132–5; T. E. Quill, Book Review, 
“Linda L. Emanuel, ed., Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues 
Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Journal of Health Policy & Law 25 (2000): 391–
402, at 393 (describing “the glib and biased accounting of the Dutch experience in the U.S. 
literature”, citing Hendin, supra note 18); R. Dworkin, “Assisted Suicide: What the Court 
Really Said,” New York Review of Books 44(14) (1997): 40–4, at 43, note 13. An exchange 
between Hendin and Dworkin is found at “Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: An Exchange,” 
New York Review of Books 44, no. 17 (1997): 68–70, at 69–70. 
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“regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving vulnerable 
persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia.”20 
No attempt was made to investigate whether regulation is related to the incidence of abuse, or 
whether abuse occurs more frequently in the Netherlands than in other jurisdictions –  
questions which will be addressed in the next section.  
 
II. The Empirical Slippery Slope Argument 
The empirical slippery slope argument allows that there is a relevant moral and/or legal 
distinction between, for example, voluntary and non-voluntary, or involuntary, euthanasia, 
but that “we are bad at abiding by [that] distinction”: 
Once we allow voluntary euthanasia ... we may (or will) fail to make the 
crucial distinction, and then we will reach the morally unacceptable 
outcome of allowing involuntary euthanasia; or perhaps even though we 
will make the relevant distinction, we will not act accordingly for some 
reason (perhaps a political reason, or a reason that has to do with weakness 
of will, or some other reason).21 
 
Whether this failure to abide by the relevant distinction will occur is often difficult to resolve 
if the social change is new and innovative and evidence from other jurisdictions is 
unavailable. The Netherlands has become the primary battleground of empirical slippery 
                                                 
 
 20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997). See also, the concurring 
opinion of Souter J., id., at 785–6 (recognizing that the Dutch “evidence is contested”); Vacco 
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997). The Dutch experience was also mentioned briefly in the 
earlier decision of the Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (1996), citing New 
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in the Medical Context (1994): at 133–4. (“As to the interest in avoiding abuse 
similar to that occurring in the Netherlands, it seems clear that some physicians there practice 
nonvoluntary euthanasia, although it is not legal to do so.”) The first decision in the Ninth 
Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (1995) identified a state 
interest in “preventing abuse similar to what has occurred in the Netherlands”. See also, The 
Queen on the Application of Mrs Dianne Pretty v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 
A.C. 800, [55] (H.L.), citing Keown, supra note 3, at 261–96. 
 
 21. D. Enoch, “Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re On A 
Very Slippery Slope,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 211 (2001): 629–47, at 631 
(describing rather than supporting this argument). 
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slope arguments in the debate outside the Netherlands over the legalization of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide.22 This status “as the world’s best ‘test case’ for disputes about physician-
assisted suicide and euthanasia” has given “the experience of the Netherlands ... paramount 
importance [in] the debates over dying in the rest of the world”.23  A brief examination of the 
empirical evidence will suffice to illustrate the difficulties associated with resolving the 
competing arguments. 
Most critics rely predominantly on Dutch evidence of cases of “termination of life 
without an explicit request” as evidence for the slide from voluntary euthanasia to non-
voluntary euthanasia.24 According to the three national surveys of “medical behaviour which 
                                                 
 
 22. See, e.g., Hendin, supra note 18, at 163–5; R. Fenigsen, “A Case Against 
Dutch Euthanasia,” Hastings Center Report 19, no. 1 (1989): S22–30, at S24–6; J. Keown, 
“The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” Law Quarterly Review 108 (1992): 
51–78, at 61–78; J. Keown, “Further Reflections on Euthanasia in The Netherlands in the 
Light of The Remmelink Report and The Van Der Maas Survey,” in Luke Gormally, ed., 
Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law (London: The Linacre Centre, 1994): 219–40; 
Keown, supra note 3. 
 
 23. M. P. Battin, “The Euthanasia Debate in the United States: Conflicting Claims 
about the Netherlands,” in H. Krabbendam and H.-M. ten Napel, eds., Regulating Morality: A 
Comparison of The Role of the State in Mastering the Mores in the Netherlands and the 
United States (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2000): 151–71, at 156–7. 
 
 24. See, e.g., Fenigsen, supra note 22, at 24–6 (“Those who contend that it is 
possible to accept and practice “voluntary” euthanasia and not allow involuntary [euthanasia] 
totally disregard the Dutch reality”); R. Fenigsen, “Dutch Euthanasia Revisited,” Issues in 
Law & Medicine 13 (1997): 301–11, at 310–11; Keown, “The Law and Practice of 
Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” supra note 22, at 61–78; Keown, “Further Reflections,” 
supra note 22, at 219; Amarasekara and Bagaric, supra note 6, at 189; H. Jochemsen and J. 
Keown, “Voluntary Euthanasia under Control? Further Empirical Evidence from the 
Netherlands,” Journal of Medical Ethics 25, no. 1 (1999): 16–21, at 17–18, 20; Pretty v. 
United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1, [31] (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (summarizing the intervention of 
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales). See contra, H. Rigter, “Euthanasia 
in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Facts from Fiction,” Hastings Center Report 19, no. 1 
(1989): S31–2, S31–2 (arguing that there is no evidence of involuntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands); G. M. Aartsen et al., “Letter to the Editor,” Hastings Center Report 19, no. 5 
(1989): 47 (agreeing with Rigter’s assessment of euthanasia in the Netherlands and 
describing Fenigsen’s article, supra note 22, as “completely misplaced”); Van der Maas, 
“Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life,” supra note 11, at 669, 
criticizing “ill-founded speculation” by Fenigsen (supra note 22) on the number of cases of 
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shortens life” in the Netherlands,25 the cases in the “termination of life without an explicit 
request” category represent less than one percent of all deaths.26  The figure of one thousand 
of these deaths from the first national survey in 1990 (known as the Remmelink survey27)  is 
often cited by those who use the slippery slope argument.28  
                                                                                                                                                        
euthanasia in the Netherlands.   
 
 25. The Remmelink Commission was appointed to carry out research into the 
practice of euthanasia in 1990. The research was published in full in English as P. J. van der 
Maas et al., “Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life: An 
Investigation Performed upon Request of the Commission of Inquiry into the Medical 
Practice Concerning Euthanasia,” Health Policy 22, nos. 1 and 2 (1992): 1–262 and P. J. van 
der Maas et al., Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, Health Policy Monographs, 1992). A summary of the report was also 
published in the Lancet. See Van der Maas, “Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions 
Concerning the End of Life,” supra note 11. Some of the results of the 1995 follow-up study 
were published in English in Van der Maas, “Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Other Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995,” supra 
note 11, and G. van der Wal et al., “Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-
Assisted Death in the Netherlands,” New Engl. J. Med. 335 (1996): 1706–11. A summary of 
the third follow-up study in 2001 was published in English in Onwuteaka-Philipsen, supra 
note 11. 
 
 26. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, supra note 11, at Table 1. 
 
 27. See supra note 25. The evidence is that the cases in this category are “quite 
heterogeneous” including severely handicapped neonates, coma patients and terminal cancer 
patients. In over half of the cases, there is evidence of some earlier discussion with the patient 
regarding euthanasia or a previously expressed wish. L. Pijnenborg et al., “Life Terminating 
Acts without Explicit Request of the Patient,” Lancet 341 (1993): 1196–9, at 1197; Griffiths, 
Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 226–7. This may account for the conclusion reached by 
Margaret Otlowski that “there is some basis for suggesting that the incidence of active 
termination of life without the patient’s request reported in the Remmelink survey may be 
disproportionately high.” M. Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997): at 438. The category represents non-voluntary rather than 
involuntary euthanasia. “In all situations in which there had been no discussion with the 
patient and in which no wish of the patient was known, the patients were incompetent.”  J. J. 
M. van Delden et al., “The Remmelink Study: 2 Years Later,” Hastings Center Report 23, no. 
6 (1993): 24–7, at 25. Significantly, “most of these cases resemble death due to 
administration of pain relief more than they do euthanasia.” Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, id., 
at 228 (“In 65% of the cases only morphine or the like was used, and in only 8% were muscle 
relaxants used, whereas in the case of euthanasia muscle relaxants are now used 90% of the 
time”). See also, Van Delden, id., at 25. A further indication that at least some of these cases 
would be better classified as due to the administration of pain relief is that “[a]lmost all [of 
them] involve patients with only a few hours or days to live.” Pijnenborg, id., at 1198. 
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 The critics who rely on this slippery slope argument often omit two important elements, 
thereby using flawed logic.  First, the argument is only effective against legalization if it is 
legalization which causes the slippery slope.29  Second, it is only effective if it is used 
comparatively, to show that the slope is more slippery in the Netherlands than it is in 
jurisdictions which have not legalized assisted suicide or euthanasia.30  Since these questions 
have not been addressed by critics, little attention has been paid to available evidence on 
causation and comparability.  
 
A. The Causal Argument 
In order to show that legalization causes a slippery slope from voluntary to non-voluntary 
euthanasia, one must show that (1) there has been an increase in the rate of non-voluntary 
                                                                                                                                                        
 28. See E. D. Pellegrino, “The False Promise of Beneficent Killing,” in L. L. 
Emanuel, ed., Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding 
Physician-Assisted Suicide (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998): 71–91, at 88; 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997); Keown, “Further Reflections,” supra 
note 22; J. I. Fleming, “Euthanasia, the Netherlands, and Slippery Slopes,” Bioethics 
Research Notes (Occasional Paper No. 1) (1992): 1–10, at 6–7; T. Cipriani, “Give Me 
Liberty and Give Me Death,” Journal of Law & Medicine 3 (1995): 177–90, at 190.  
 
 29. J. J. M. van Delden et al., “Dances with Data,” Bioethics 7 (1993): 323–9, at 
327, citing Van der Burg, supra note 1, at 57. See also, Enoch, supra note 21, at 631; 
Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 300; Otlowski, supra note 27, at 439. 
 
 30. See Van Delden, id., at 327; H. Kuhse and P. Singer, “Active Voluntary 
Euthanasia, Morality and the Law,” Journal of Law & Medicine 3 (1995): 129–35, at 132; 
Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, id., at 300–1. Raphael Cohen-Almagor views the comparative 
argument with scepticism, arguing that its use by the Dutch is a form of defensiveness: 
“Many Dutch scientists suggest that physicians in many countries are secretly doing what 
Dutch physicians are doing openly. However, this suggestion is dubious. There are not 
enough data to either support or refute this suggestion.” R. Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia in 
the Netherlands: The Policy and Practice of Mercy Killing (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004): at 
147–8, citing only one source for his first sentence: L. Pijnenborg, “The Dutch Euthanasia 
Debate in International Perspective,” in End-of-Life Decisions in Dutch Medical Practice 
(Rotterdam: Thesis, 1995): at 119–31. Section III.B infra examines the comparative 
evidence. 
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euthanasia following the legalization of voluntary euthanasia,31 and (2) that increase was 
caused by the legalization of voluntary euthanasia.  
 
1. A Post-Legalization Increase in Non-Voluntary Euthanasia 
Although there have been three major Dutch investigations, unfortunately the Dutch 
empirical evidence does not cover the period prior to effective legalization.32  The first 
comprehensive Dutch survey took place in 1990. We do not know, therefore, whether the rate 
of non-voluntary euthanasia was lower or higher prior to effective legalization, or whether it 
has remained relatively stable.33  While conceding this point, John Keown argues that the 
inference that non-voluntary euthanasia has in fact increased is more plausible than the 
inference that it has decreased or remained stable: 
[T]here is good reason to think that NVAE [non-voluntary active 
euthanasia] has indeed increased since 1984. Breach of the guideline 
requiring a request is more likely to occur in a situation in which some VAE 
is allowed than when none is allowed, if only because of the greater 
problems in policing a practice allowed according to professional guidelines 
than a practice which is legally prohibited. Moreover, the official 
endorsement of NVAE by, for example, the Remmelink Commission can 
only have served to lessen doctors’ inhibitions against it. Despite the 
absence of prior statistics it is, therefore, more plausible to conclude that 
NVAE has increased since 1984 rather than remained static.34 
                                                 
 
 31. “To demonstrate a slippery slope one would need to show that something 
changed after introducing a certain practice and for this at least two investigations would be 
required.” Van Delden, id. See also, Kuhse and Singer, id.; Otlowski, supra note 27, at 439. 
 
 32. M. A. M. de Wachter, “Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” JAMA 262 
(1989): 3316–19, at 3316–17; Van Delden, supra note 27, at 26. For a discussion of the 
relevant judicial decisions, see Lewis, supra note 8, at 76-83. 
 
 33. See J. Griffiths, “Comparative Reflections: Is the Dutch Case Unique?” in 
Klijn, supra note 11, 197–205, at 202 (“there is no evidence that ... termination of life without 
a request has become more frequent since legalisation in 1984”). 
 
 34. J. Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002): at 146 (emphasis in original). John Griffiths suggests on the contrary 
that “it seems pretty clear that many of the things to which opponents of euthanasia point as 
the horribles to which legalisation will lead, in fact pre-existed legalisation of euthanasia in 
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The evidence of “underground euthanasia” described below casts doubt on Keown’s claim 
that it is easier to police a prohibitive regime than a regulatory one.35  The argument that 
doctors’ inhibitions against non-voluntary euthanasia will have been lessened by legalization 
is even less persuasive, as if this were the case one would expect to see a gradual rise in the 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in the post-legalization period.  Instead, the Dutch surveys 
of 1990, 1995 and 2001 reveal that the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia or “ending of life 
without explicit request” has remained stable since 1990 at 0.8% of all deaths in 1990 and 
0.7% of all deaths in 1995 and 2001.36  Paul van der Maas and Linda Emanuel therefore 
conclude that “neither the argument that such cases increase in number over time, nor the 
argument that open regulation lowers the rate, is well supported by the data.”37 
 Neil Gorsuch makes a more moderate argument, contending that in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, one would expect that the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and 
assisted suicide would cause an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia: 
[C]onsistent with the law of demand, legalizing voluntary assisted suicide 
and euthanasia (and thus reducing the “price” associated with the practices) 
would lead to an increase in the frequency of the practices when compared 
with baseline, prelegalization rates in any given country.... As 
nonconsensual killings become more acceptable – as they surely have in the 
Netherlands, where the government has sought to justify them as a 
“necessity,” and where some, such as Griffiths, have urged their complete 
decriminalization – one would expect the number of such cases to increase, 
not remain constant as Kuhse seems to suppose. While an exception to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Netherlands”. Griffiths, supra note 33, at 202. 
 
 35. See infra, at section III.B and R. S. Magnusson, Angels of Death — Exploring 
the Euthanasia Underground (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
 
 36. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, supra note 11, at Table 1 (95% CIs 0.6%-1.1% and 
0.5%-0.9% respectively). These figures are based on death certificate studies. The 1990 
survey did not collect interview data on this issue, but the relevant interview figures for the 
other two surveys are 0.7% (1995, 95% CI 0.5%-0.8%) and 0.6% (2001, 95% CI 0.4%-
0.9%). 
 
 37. P. van der Maas and L. L. Emanuel, “Factual Findings,” in Emanuel, supra 
note 28, 151–74, at 160. 
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law of demand is not inconceivable, any theory that depends on such an 
extraordinary exception would require considerable proof.38  
 
In the absence of evidence relating to the period before legalization, Gorsuch’s argument 
would be more persuasive if, instead of remaining stable, the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia 
in the Netherlands had risen steadily during the period after effective legalization, particularly 
during the late 1990s following the decisions in the Prins and Kadijk cases of neonatal 
termination of life.39  On the contrary, Jocelyn Downie suggests that the fact that the rate of 
non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands has not increased over the period of the Dutch 
surveys indicates that there is no slippery slope.40  
 Neither the interpretations by Keown and Gorsuch, on one side, nor Downie on the 
other, are sustainable on the basis of the current empirical evidence. The Dutch data does not 
precisely address the issue of legalization, as there is no evidence of the rate of non-voluntary 
euthanasia prior to legalization with which to compare the steady post-legalization rate. 
Similarly, no such evidence exists in relation to the period prior to legalization of assisted 
suicide in Oregon.41  
In the absence of data on the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands prior 
to legalization, the best hope for relevant data currently lies with a repeat of the pre-
                                                 
 
 38. N. M. Gorsuch, “The Legalization of Assisted Suicide and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences: A Review of the Dutch and Oregon Experiments and Leading 
Utilitarian Arguments For Legal Change,” Wisconsin Law Review (2004): 1347–1423, at 
1395–6 (emphasis added), citing Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 267–98; H. 
Kuhse, “From Intention to Consent: Learning from Experience with Euthanasia,” in M. P. 
Battin et al., eds., Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate (New York: Routledge, 
1998): 252–66, at 263–6. Kuhse’s argument is discussed infra, text accompanying note 94. 
 
 39. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 129-33; J. H. H. M. Dorscheidt, “Assessment 
Procedures Regarding End-of-Life Decisions in Neonatology in the Netherlands,” Medicine 
& Law 24 (2005): 803–29, at 804–6; Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 83, App. 
II-3, 341. 
 
 40. Downie, supra note 19, at 135–6. 
 
 41. Id., at 137, note 56. 
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legalization survey in Flanders, Belgium which would allow a comparison between the rates 
of non-voluntary euthanasia in Belgium before and after legalization.42  
 
2. An Increase Caused by Legalization 
Discussion of this second step of the causation argument is entirely speculative in the absence 
of any evidence of an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia following legalization 
in any jurisdiction which has legalized.  However, as John Griffiths points out, were there to 
be evidence of an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia following legalization, a 
causal link could not necessarily be inferred: 
[T]he contention assumes that the reason for the increase in the frequency 
of termination of life without a request – if it had taken place – would lie in 
the legalisation of euthanasia and not – for example – in the fact that such 
behaviour had come to be regarded as not always and under all 
circumstances objectionable.43  
 
This argument does not preclude the possibility that changes in societal norms could be 
caused by legalization, in which case there could be a causal, albeit indirect, connection 
between legalization and an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia.  Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule suggest that changes in norms might precede legalization, thus negating the 
possibility of a causal link between legalization and an increase in the rate of non-voluntary 
euthanasia: 
Jochemsen and Keown, who are critics of Dutch euthanasia, argue that 
legalization has resulted in a slide down the slippery slope because the 
Dutch now condone some types of non-voluntary euthanasia.44 But the 
authors cannot trace this change in attitude to legalization – legalization 
may have followed changes in attitudes – and in any event the change in 
attitudes can be attributed to benign causes: exposed to public debate about 
                                                 
 42. L. Deliens et al., “End-of-Life Decisions in Medical Practice in Flanders, 
Belgium: A Nationwide Survey,” Lancet 356 (2000): 1806–11, at Table 5. The Belgian data 
is discussed infra, text accompanying note 56. 
 
 43. Griffiths, supra note 33, at 202 (emphasis in the original).  
 
 44. Supra note 24, at 20–1. 
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euthanasia practices, the Dutch view toward euthanasia, unsurprisingly, has 
evolved.45 
 
 It is true that evidence of causation is likely to be difficult to establish.46 Nevertheless, a 
significant increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia within a short time during which 
legalization has taken place, would strongly suggest that legalization has had an influence on 
the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. Although such evidence does not exist in relation to the 
Dutch model, again Belgium provides a good opportunity to collect evidence in the near 
future.47 
In the absence of evidence of causation, or even of a post-legalization increase in the 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia, critics of Dutch law and practice have drawn causative 
inferences simply from the evidence of the existence of non-voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands. For example, Kumar Amarasekara and Mirko Bagaric argue: 
The ... only cogent evidence ... shows in a climate where voluntary 
euthanasia is openly practiced, there are also a large number of cases of 
non-voluntary euthanasia. It may be that the rate of non-voluntary 
euthanasia in Holland was not increased by the decision to give the green 
light to voluntary euthanasia. But given that we know that one state of 
affairs (ie where euthanasia is practiced with impunity) definitely leads to 
undesirable consequences and are unsure about the situation in the 
alternative state of affairs (where euthanasia is prohibited and this 
prohibition is enforced), logically we ought to opt for the later [sic] – 
speculative or possible dangers being accorded far less weight than certain 
ones.48 
  
                                                 
 
 45. E. A. Posner and A. Vermeule, “Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?” 
Michigan Law Review 104 (2006): 671–707, at note 67. 
 
 46. J. Arras has described this as “an extremely difficult problem of empirical 
prediction.” Arras, supra note 4, at 296. 
 
 47. See supra, text accompanying note 42. 
 
 48. Amarasekara and Bagaric, supra note 6, at 190 (emphasis in original). The 
argument is reproduced in M. Bagaric, “The Kuhse-Singer Euthanasia Survey: Why it Fails 
to Undermine the Slippery Slope Argument – Comparing Apples and Apples,” European 
Journal of Health Law 9 (2002): 229–41, at 233. 
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Logically, however, this does not follow.  Amarasekara and Bagaric admit that there may be 
no link between legalization in the Netherlands and the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia, and 
yet in the next sentence assert that they “know” that legalization “definitely leads to 
undesirable consequences.”  How do they know this?  Leaving aside the fact that there is no 
evidence of a post-legalization increase in the Dutch rate of non-voluntary euthanasia, the 
temptation to assume that the legalization of voluntary euthanasia causes non-voluntary 
euthanasia to occur, while understandable, should be resisted in the absence of evidence of 
causation. The presence of both legalization and non-voluntary euthanasia does not 
necessitate a causal connection between the two. As Stephen Smith has recently written: 
Groups may assume that the presence of A and B together leads to the 
conclusion that there is a connection. There may not always be such a 
connection or there may not be the right sort of connection for a slippery 
slope argument. In other words, the simple fact that A and B are present 
does not lend any authority to the claim that A led to B. More specific 
evidence, and more specific causal evidence, is required before a slippery 
slope claim can be verified.49   
 
 
B. The Comparative Argument 
The previous section illustrated that at present there is no direct evidence that legalization 
causes an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia.  However, if rates of non-
voluntary euthanasia are higher in jurisdictions which have legalized voluntary euthanasia 
than in those which have not, this may suggest indirectly that legalization has caused an 
increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia.  Conversely, if rates of non-voluntary 
euthanasia are higher in jurisdictions in which voluntary euthanasia remains illegal, the force 
of this empirical slippery slope argument is further attenuated.  The first part of this section 
examines comparative evidence of the rates of non-voluntary euthanasia across jurisdictions 
                                                 
 
 49. S. W. Smith, “Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on 
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,” Medical Law Review 13 (2005): 17–44, at 22. 
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in which the legal status of voluntary euthanasia varies.  The second part discusses the limits 
on the inferences which may be drawn from this comparative evidence. 
 
1. Comparative Evidence 
There is no evidence demonstrating that the Netherlands has a greater rate of non-voluntary 
or involuntary euthanasia than other Western countries.50  Indeed, there is a significant 
amount of evidence demonstrating the prevalence of both voluntary and non-voluntary active 
euthanasia in various jurisdictions in which euthanasia has not been legalized, looking at 
criminal prosecutions,51 admissions by doctors52 and anonymous surveys of medical 
professionals.  The survey evidence is the most cogent and has been the most hotly contested. 
 
A. Survey Prevalence Evidence 
As discussed in the previous section, the rate of “ending of life without explicit request” in 
the three Dutch surveys has remained stable.53  While critics of Dutch practice tend to focus 
on the raw numbers of deaths in this category,54 those in favor of legalization and those who 
defend Dutch practice have responded by citing surveys from other countries which indicate 
                                                 
 
 50. Griffiths, supra note 33, at 202; Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 
301, note 4. 
 
 51. Some of the relevant cases are mentioned in Lewis, supra note 8, at 6-11, 95-
7. See also, Otlowski, supra note 27, at 140–8; B. Sneiderman, “The Case of Robert Latimer: 
A Commentary on Crime and Punishment,” Alberta Law Review 37 (1999): 1017–44, at ¶60, 
¶85–¶87; Downie, supra note 19, at 137, note 57; L. Dietz et al., “Aiding, Abetting, or 
Counseling Suicide; Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,” 40A Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 623 
(2006) (please clarify citation and provide full name of publication – this is a treatise 
available on Westlaw – I’m attaching it); J. M. Thunder, “Quiet Killings in Medical 
Facilities: Detection and Prevention,” Issues in Law & Medicine 18 (2003): 211–35, at 213.  
 
 52. See generally, Otlowski, id. at 134–8; Magnusson, supra note 35. 
 
 53. See supra, text accompanying note 36. 
 
 54. See supra, text accompanying note 28. 
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that the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in some Western jurisdictions which have not 
legalized euthanasia or assisted suicide is higher than it is in the Netherlands.  For example, a 
1996 Australian anonymous postal survey of doctors based on the interview questionnaire 
used in the 1995 Dutch study found that the rate of termination of life without explicit request 
was 3.5% of all deaths.55  A 1998 death certificate study (based on the Dutch model) in 
Flanders, Belgium, prior to legalization, reported a rate of “ending of life without the 
patient’s explicit request” of 3.2%.56 The authors of this study have commented that “the fact 
that the figure is four to five times higher in Flanders than in the neighbouring Netherlands 
supports the conclusion that the Belgian rate is unexpectedly high ... another possibility is 
that the Dutch rate is unexpectedly low.”57  
 However, a recent survey in the United Kingdom based on the same methodology as 
the Australian study reported a much lower rate of ending of life without explicit request 
from the patient of 0.33% of all deaths.58  A pan-European study based on data from 2001-
2002 found rates of ending of life without the patient’s explicit request varied between 1.5% 
in Flanders, Belgium (prior to legalization) and 0.06% in Italy. This data is shown in the 
following table alongside the Australian data referred to earlier:  
                                                 
 
 55. H. Kuhse et al., “End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice,” 
Medical Journal of Australia 166 (1997): 191–6, at Box 4 (95% CI 2.7%-4.3%). Further 
Australian evidence is discussed infra note 62. 
 
 56. Deliens, supra note 42, at Table 5 (95% CI 2.7%-3.8%). The pilot study which 
preceded this study is described in F. Mortier et al., “End-of-life Decisions of Physicians in 
the City of Hasselt (Flanders, Belgium),” Bioethics 14 (2000): 254–67. See also, F. Mortier et 
al., “Attitudes, Sociodemographic Characteristics, and Actual End-of-Life Decisions of 
Physicians in Flanders, Belgium,” Medical Decision Making 23 (2003): 502–10. 
 
 57. F. Mortier and L. Deliens, “The Prospects of Effective Legal Control on 
Euthanasia in Belgium: Implications of Recent End-of-Life Studies,” in Klijn, supra note 11, 
179–95, at 184, note 17.  
 
 58. C. Seale, “National Survey of End-of-Life Decisions Made by UK Medical 
Practitioners,” Palliative Medicine 20 (2006): 3–10, at Table 2. The survey was carried out in 
2004-2005. A full comparison between the Australian and U.K. data is found in Table 2. 
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Table 1: Rates of ending life without the patient’s explicit request (percentage of deaths 
and 95% confidence interval)59 
 
Country Australia U.K. Belgium Denmark Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland 
Including 
SUDs*  
3.5 
(2.7-4.3) 
0.33 
(0-
0.76
) 
1.5 
(1.12-
2.01) 
0.67 
(0.44-
1.04) 
0.06 
(0.01
-
0.29) 
0.60 
(0.43-0.84) 
0.23 
(0.11-
0.47) 
0.42 
(0.25-0.70) 
Excludin
g SUDs* 
 0.36  
(0-
0.87
) 
2.26 
(1.59-
2.93) 
1.02 
(0.57-
1.47) 
0.11 
(0-
0.26) 
0.90 
(0.59-1.21) 
0.31 
(0.08-
0.54) 
0.61 
(0.29-0.93) 
 
*SUDs = sudden and unexpected deaths 
 
 
The rates of non-voluntary euthanasia in Australia, Belgium (pre-legalization) and Denmark 
were all higher than the rate in the Netherlands, the only jurisdiction in which termination of 
life on request was lawful at the time of these surveys. Other jurisdictions in which voluntary 
euthanasia was and remains illegal had significantly lower rates of non-voluntary euthanasia, 
including the United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden. 
 
B. Beyond Non-Voluntary Euthanasia Prevalence Rates  
Although comparable evidence of rates of non-voluntary euthanasia from other jurisdictions 
is unavailable,60 there is considerable evidence that both non-voluntary and voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are practiced in jurisdictions in which they are subject to 
criminal prohibition including Canada,61 Australia,62 New Zealand,63 the United States64 and 
                                                 
 
 59. This data is from A. van der Heide et al., “End-of-Life Decision-Making in 6 
European Countries: Descriptive Study,” Lancet 362 (2003): 345-50, at Table 2; Seale, id., at 
Tables 2 and 3; Kuhse, supra note 55, at Box 4. 
 
 60. “[E]pidemiological research concerning medical decision-making at the end of 
life is ... rather scarce”. A. van der Heide et al., “End-of-life Decisions in 6 European 
Countries: A Research Note,” in Klijn, supra note 11, 129–34, at 131. 
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the United Kingdom65 as well as other European jurisdictions.  The pan-European study 
discussed above also includes data on rates of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. This 
data is shown in the following table alongside the corresponding Australian data: 
                                                                                                                                                        
 61. See N. Searles, “Silence Doesn’t Obliterate the Truth: A Manitoba Survey on 
Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,” Health Law Review 4 (1996): 9–16, at ¶22, 
Table 4 (“A little more than one in seven doctors indicated they had facilitated a patient’s 
request for assisted suicide or euthanasia by hastening her or his death”); Downie, supra note 
19, at 137–8. 
 
 62. See Kuhse, supra note 55, at Box 4: 1.8% of deaths were due to voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide (95% CI 1.2%-2.4%); C. D. Douglas et al., “The Intention to 
Hasten Death: A Survey of Attitudes and Practices of Surgeons in Australia,” Medical 
Journal of Australia 175 (2001): 511–5 (5.3% of respondents reported giving a lethal 
injection or providing the means to commit suicide on request); H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 
“Doctors’ Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia,” Medical Journal of 
Australia 148 (1988): 623–7, at 624 (29% of responding doctors had taken active steps to end 
a patient’s life on request); C. A. Stevens and R. Hassan, “Management of Death, Dying and 
Euthanasia: Attitudes And Practices of Medical Practitioners in South Australia,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 20 (1994): 41–6, at 43 (18.8% of responding doctors had taken active steps to 
bring about the death of a patient; 49% of this group had never received a request from a 
patient); P. Baume and E. O’Malley, “Euthanasia: Attitudes and Practices of Medical 
Practitioners,” Medical Journal of Australia 161 (1994): 137–44 (12.3% of reporting doctors 
had complied with a patient request to hasten death; 7% had provided the means for suicide). 
 
 63. See K. Mitchell and R. G. Owens, “National Survey of Medical Decisions at 
End of Life Made by New Zealand General Practitioners,” British Medical Journal 327 
(2003): 202–3 (5.6% of respondent doctors making an end-of-life decision at the last death 
attended had performed active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide; 44% of these 
decisions had not been discussed with the patient, almost entirely because the patient was no 
longer competent). A direct comparison between this study and the most recent U.K. study is 
found in Seale, supra note 58, at Table 4: the rate of active euthanasia or physician-assisted 
suicide at the last death attended across all respondents (not simply those who made an end-
of-life decision) was 3.1% in the New Zealand study (95% CI 2.1%-4.1%) and 1.4% in the 
U.K. study (95% CI 0.3%-2.5%). 
 
 64. The empirical evidence is reviewed in E. J. Emanuel, “Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Review of the Empirical Data From the United States,” 
Archives of Internal Medicine 162 (2002): 142–52, at 146, Table 4 (“Many studies indicate 
that a small, but definite, proportion of US physicians have performed euthanasia or PAS, 
despite its being illegal.... [T]he data provide conflicting evidence on the precise frequency of 
such interventions, with reported frequencies varying more than 6-fold even among the best 
studies”).  
 
 65. See Seale, supra note 58, at Table 2; B. J. Ward and P. A. Tate, “Attitudes 
among NHS Doctors To Requests for Euthanasia,” BMJ 308 (1994): 1332–4 (12% of 
responding doctors had taken active steps to hasten death on request); S. A. M. McLean and 
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A. Britton, Sometimes A Small Victory (Glasgow: Institute of Law and Ethics in Medicine, 
1996): at App. III, Table 17, 31–2, discussed in Keown, supra note 34, at 61 and M. 
Freeman, “Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Dianne Pretty Case,” Medical Law 
Review 10 (2002): 245–70, at 249, note 31 (4% of responding Scottish health professionals 
had assisted suicide). The House of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill doubted some of the U.K. survey evidence: “Bearing in mind however the 
trend towards death taking place in hospital rather than at home, the increasing prevalence of 
team-working in clinical care, the greater tendency for people to litigate where they suspect 
malpractice, and the potential for confusion with the legal administration of drugs to prevent 
restlessness and anxiety in the last hours of life, we would be surprised if covert euthanasia 
were being practised on anything like the scale which some of these surveys suggest.” House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, Report, HL 
Paper 86-I (2005): at ¶239, available at 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/86i.pdf> (last visited 
December 13, 2006).  
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Table 2: Rates of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (percentage of deaths and 
95% confidence interval)66 
 
Country  Australia U.K. Belgium Denmark Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland 
Including  
SUDs*  
EUT** 1.8  
(1.2-2.4) 
0.16 
(0-
0.36) 
0.3 
(0.16-
0.58) 
0.06 
(0.01-
0.26) 
0.04 
(0-
0.27) 
2.59 
(2.19-3.04) 
- 0.27 
(0.14-0.51) 
PAS*** 0.10 
(0.02-
0.18) 
0.00 0.01 
(0-0.28) 
0.06 
(0.01-
0.26) 
0.00 
 
0.21 
(0.12-0.38) 
- 0.36 
(0.20-0.63) 
Excluding 
SUDs* 
EUT**  0.17 
(0-
0.51) 
0.46 
(0.17-
0.75) 
0.10 
(0-0.24) 
0.05 
(0-
0.15) 
3.89 
(3.49-4.29) 
- 0.39 
(0.13-0.65) 
PAS***  0.00 0.05 
(0-0.15) 
0.10 
(0-0.24) 
0.00 0.31 
(0.13-0.49) 
- 0.52 
(0.22-0.82) 
*SUDs = sudden and unexpected deaths   
**EUT = euthanasia  ***PAS = physician-assisted suicide 
 
2. Difficulties Associated With The Comparative Evidence 
A. Lack Of Reliable Data 
Not only is there a dearth of pre-legalization evidence in the Netherlands,67 but studies 
similar to those subsequently undertaken in the Netherlands are rare,68 although the recent 
Australian, United Kingdom and pan-European research has provided some points of 
comparison.69  However, the Australian survey has been heavily criticized on methodological 
grounds.70  The more recent U.K. survey using similar methodology corrected one flaw in the 
                                                 
 
 66. This data is from Van der Heide, supra note 59, at Table 2; Seale, supra note 
58, at Tables 2 and 3; Kuhse, supra note 55, at Box 4. 
 
 67. See supra, text accompanying notes 32–37.  
 
 68. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 30, at 26. 
 
 69. See Kuhse, supra note 55; Seale, supra note 58; Van der Heide, supra note 59. 
 
 70. Some of the criticism was canvassed by the Australian Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee in its report on the Bill to overrule the Northern 
Territory legislation. Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996 (1997): at 88–9 (on the Northern Territory 
legislation, see Lewis, supra note 8, at 157-8). See also, K. Amarasekara, “Euthanasia and the 
Quality of Legislative Safeguards,” Monash University Law Review 23 (1997): 1–42, at 15–
16; Amarasekara and Bagaric, supra note 6, at 191; Gorsuch, supra note 38, at 1396–1400. 
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Australian study which had the effect of “artificially inflat[ing] the proportion of deaths 
receiving” end-of-life decisions.71  The Australian data is nonetheless included here because 
it has become an important weapon in the armory of pro-legalization commentators.72  
 A further difficulty with the comparative evidence is that “legal and cultural 
differences” make valid comparisons difficult.73  This is particularly true of comparisons 
between jurisdictions with very different health care systems.74 
 
B. Effect of the Topic 
Collecting data about the prevalence of euthanasia and assisted suicide is a difficult 
enterprise. Even though most surveys focus on disclosure by individual practitioners given 
guarantees of anonymity, rather than on reports to the authorities, under-disclosure is likely. 
                                                 
 
 71. Seale, supra note 58, at 6: “Sudden and unexpected deaths are excluded from 
Table 3 to control for an artefactual effect that applied to this and the Australian study, which 
chose deaths according to the most recent one nominated by the respondent. Significantly 
fewer such deaths were nominated by UK and Australian doctors than in studies based on 
samples of death certificates. The effect of this is to artificially inflate the proportion of 
deaths receiving ELDs [end-of-life decisions], a point not appreciated by the Australian 
investigators.” 
 
 72. See, e.g., Kuhse, supra note 55, at 196 (noting that their study comparing 
Australia and the Netherlands weakens the assumption that countries openly practising 
euthanasia have higher non-voluntary euthanasia rates than countries not openly practising 
euthanasia); M. Otlowski, “The Effectiveness of Legal Control of Euthanasia: Lessons from 
Comparative Law,” in Klijn, supra note 11, 137–55, at 141–3, 152–5; D. Morris, “Assisted 
Suicide under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Critique,” European Human 
Rights Law Review 1 (2003): 65–91, 84.  
 
 73. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 30, at 26. See also, B. D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et 
al., “End-of-Life Decision Making in Europe and Australia: A Physician Survey,” Archives of 
Internal Medicine 166 (2006): 921–9, at 927–8. On social contexts as an influence on the 
strength of slippery slope arguments, see Lode, supra note 1, at 1493–4. 
 
 74. See Van der Maas and Emanuel, supra note 37, at 161; T. H. Stone and W. J. 
Winslade, “Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States,” Journal of Legal 
Medicine 16 (1995): 481–507, at note 70; Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, supra note 19, at 304–
5; Otlowski, supra note 27, at 452–4; M. P. Battin, “A Dozen Caveats Concerning the 
Discussion of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” in M. P. Battin, The Least Worst Death: Essays 
in Bioethics on the End of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 130–44, at 140–1. 
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This is particularly so in jurisdictions in which these acts are illegal,75 although some 
researchers have reported high response rates.76  In Roger Magnusson’s study of the 
euthanasia underground in the United States and Australia, he found evidence of practiced 
deception amongst practitioners: 
Deception permeates every aspect of illicit euthanasia practice. By all 
accounts, health care workers are remarkably accomplished in their 
deception. Deceptive practices contribute to the invisibility of euthanasia, 
and help to perpetuate the myth that because euthanasia is prohibited, it 
never occurs.77 
 
The presence of criminal prohibitions makes the comparative evidence difficult to assess. 
Looking at the rather scant Canadian evidence, Lorraine Weinrib observes: 
It may well be that the criminal prohibition in Canada hides the incidence of 
assisted suicide, particularly in respect to the terminally ill. Without any 
data for Canada, it is not possible to pinpoint our place on the slippery 
slope, i.e. whether there is a problem to avoid or a problem to regulate.78 
 
 Even post-legalization, practitioners may be reluctant to report cases which did not 
comply with the relevant criteria,79 and this reluctance may extend to disclosure to 
                                                 
 
 75. Searles, supra note 62, at ¶27 (“If the response rate is thought to be low, this is 
due predominantly to the controversial nature of the subject matter of this investigation. 
Physicians were asked if they have ever committed indictable offences, punishable by harsh 
professional and criminal sentences.”); M. T. Muller et al., “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: 
Facts, Figures and Fancies with Special Regard to Old Age,” Drugs & Aging 13 (1998): 185–
91, at 189; Downie, supra note 19, at 137; Seale, supra note 58, at 6. 
 
 76. Emanuel, “The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
United States,” supra note 64, at 512. 
 
 77. Magnusson, supra note 35, at 229. 
 
 78. Weinrib, supra note 4, at note 77. 
 
 79. Mortier and Deliens, supra note 57, at 179; J. M. Cuperus-Bosma et al., 
“Physician-Assisted Death: Policy-Making by the Assembly of Prosecutors General in the 
Netherlands,” European Journal of Health Law 4 (1997): 225–38, at 236–7; B. Sneiderman, 
J. C. Irvine and P. H. Osborne, Canadian Medical Law: An Introduction for Physicians, 
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2003): at 727 (quoting G. van der Wal, Euthanasia En Hulp by Zelfdoding Door Huisartsen 
(Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide by Family Physicians) (Rotterdam: WYT Uitgeefgroep, 
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researchers despite guarantees of anonymity.  Practitioners who are involved in a number of 
assisted deaths may not remember each one, which may result in inadvertent under-reporting 
or under-disclosure.80  Reports may also be moulded so as to better fit the relevant criteria, 
and this may also affect disclosure to researchers.81 
 
3. Drawing Inferences from the Comparative Data 
A. The Problem of the Baseline 
Even if the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia is higher in some jurisdictions which have not 
legalized (such as Australia) than in jurisdictions which have (such as the Netherlands) this 
could be consistent with the proposition “that different countries have different baseline 
(prelegalization) rates ... because of unrelated cultural phenomena.”82  For example, Clive 
                                                                                                                                                        
1992): at 12: “physicians, having been informed about the requirements for prudent care, 
only report those cases of which they are almost certain that they will not be prosecuted”); H. 
Jochemsen, “Why Euthanasia Should not be Legalized: A Reflection on the Dutch 
Experiment,” in D. N. Weisstub et al., eds., Aging: Decisions at the End of Life (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001): 67–90, at 77. The 1995 Dutch research indicated, 
however, that failure to report was generally related to a failure to meet one of the procedural 
requirements (such as obtaining a written request; consultation with another physician; or 
providing a written report). “There were no major differences between reported and 
unreported cases in terms of the patients’ characteristics or the basis for the decision to 
provide assistance (i.e., whether there was an explicit request and unbearable and hopeless 
suffering).” Van der Wal, supra note 25, at 1708. Similar results were reported in later 
research. See B. D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., “Dutch Experience of Monitoring 
Euthanasia,” British Medical Journal 331 (2005): 691–3, at 692, and in earlier research 
amongst family doctors only. See G. van der Wal et al., “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide II. 
Do Dutch Family Doctors Act Prudently?” Family Practice 9 (1992): 135–40, at 137–40. 
 
 80. R. Pool, Negotiating a Good Death: Euthanasia in the Netherlands 
(Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press, 2000): at 110, 114 (based on a small, non-scientific 
sample).  
 
 81. Van der Wal, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide By Family Physicians, supra 
note 79, at 12, translated in Sneiderman, Irvine and Osborne, supra note 79, at 727. 
 
 82. Gorsuch, supra note 38, at 1395.  
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Seale has proposed the following explanation for the low rates of both non-voluntary and 
voluntary euthanasia found in his recent U.K. survey:83 
The lower relative rate of [end-of life decisions] involving doctor-assisted 
dying in the UK, and the relatively high rate of [non-treatment decisions],84 
suggests a culture of medical decision making informed by a palliative care 
philosophy. Historically the UK developed palliative care approaches earlier 
than the other countries in which the survey has been done, supporting this 
interpretation. The situation may also reflect, amongst GPs in particular, 
fears arising from the Harold Shipman scandal in which a UK GP was 
convicted of causing the deaths of numerous patients by administering 
lethal injections.85 
 
 There is some evidence that the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia may be inversely 
proportional to the rate of discussion with patients, families and colleagues.86  For example, 
Freddy Mortier and Luc Deliens suggest that one explanation for the relatively high Belgian 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia is that “in Belgium, the patient’s autonomy is legally less 
clearly recognized and paternalistic medical practice appears to be more widely accepted.”87  
Patients’ rights have only recently been recognized by statute in Belgium.88  The higher 
Belgian rates of failure to discuss with the patient both non-treatment decisions and palliative 
                                                 
 
 83. See supra, text accompanying notes 58–59 and note 66. 
 
 84. The U.K. rate of non-treatment decisions as a percentage of non-sudden deaths 
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 85. Seale, id., at 8. 
 
 86. C. Seale, “Characteristics of End-Of-Life Decisions: Survey of UK Medical 
Practitioners,” Palliative Medicine 20 (2006): 653-9. 
 
 87. Mortier and Deliens, supra note 57, at 186–7. The Belgian data is discussed 
supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.   
 
 88. Law concerning the rights of the patient of August 22, 2002, discussed by H. 
Nys, “Recent Developments in Health Law in Belgium,” European Journal of Health Law 13 
(2006): 95–9. 
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measures intended to shorten the patient’s life (in comparison to the Netherlands) are 
consistent with this explanation.89  Helga Kuhse et al., in their Australian study, suggest that 
prohibition may be linked to low rates of discussion with patients and families: “it may be 
that, because existing laws prohibit the intentional termination of life, doctors are reluctant to 
discuss medical end-of-life decisions with their patients lest these decisions be construed as 
collaboration in euthanasia or in the intentional termination of life.”90 
 Due to the problem of the baseline, the comparative evidence does not rule out the 
possibility that legalization of voluntary euthanasia has caused or would cause a change in the 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. To repeat, the best evidence which could be obtained on 
this point would be evidence of a significant change in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia 
within a short time period during which legalization of voluntary euthanasia has taken place. 
At present, no such evidence exists.91  
 
B. Comparing Jurisdictions which have Legalized with those which Have Not 
What can be inferred from the comparative data on the prevalence of non-voluntary 
euthanasia? Margaret Otlowski has argued that the inference to be drawn is that prohibition 
causes the higher prevalence rates in jurisdictions which have not legalized – Australia and 
pre-legalization Belgium – than in the one which has – the Netherlands: 
These research data from Belgium suggest that these practices are not 
peculiar to common law jurisdictions or to the particular approach of the 
common law, but rather, are the product of an outright prohibition on 
euthanasia under the criminal law, however this might be achieved.92 
                                                 
 
 89. Mortier and Deliens, supra note 57, at 186–7. 
 
 90. Kuhse, supra note 55. 
 
 91. See supra, text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 
 92. Otlowski, supra note 72, at 143 (emphasis added), 148. A similar argument 
was made by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society in its intervention in Pretty v. United 
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Helga Kuhse makes a similar argument, drawing on the evidence that the rate of non-
voluntary euthanasia in Australia is significantly higher than the Dutch rate:93 
There seems to be good evidence to suggest that laws prohibiting the 
intentional termination of life, but permitting the withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment and the administration of life-shortening palliative 
care, do not prevent doctors from intentionally ending the lives of some of 
their patients. There are also good reasons to believe that such laws ... 
encourage hypocrisy and unconsented-to termination of patients’ lives.94 
 
 Once again, the inference of causation has not been proven. As Gorsuch has pointed 
out, factors other than the presence of prohibition could have caused these higher rates.95  
Indeed, the fact that high rates are not found in other jurisdictions which have prohibited 
assisted dying (such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden)96 casts doubt on the inference 
proposed by Otlowski and Kuhse.  
 Kumar Amarasekara and Mirko Bagaric have argued that the Australian data does not 
refute the slippery slope argument but rather reinforces it. They contend that although 
voluntary euthanasia has not been legalized in Australia, the non-prosecution of such cases 
means that the description of Australia as a jurisdiction in which voluntary euthanasia is 
prohibited is inappropriate: 
[T]he surveys merely demonstrate that legislation is futile. If non-voluntary 
euthanasia is greater where it is illegal as in Australia than where it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1, [27] (Eur. Ct. H.R.): “The Dutch situation indicated that in 
the absence of regulation slightly less than 1% of deaths were due to doctors having ended 
the life of a patient without the latter explicitly requesting this (non-voluntary euthanasia). A 
similar studies [sic] indicated a figure of 3.1% in Belgium and 3.5% in Australia. It might 
therefore be the case that less attention was given to the requirements of a careful end of life 
practice in a society with a restrictive legal approach than in one with an open approach that 
tolerated and regulated euthanasia.” 
 
 93. See supra, text accompanying notes 36, 55. 
 
 94. Kuhse, supra note 38, at 263. 
 
 95. Gorsuch, supra note 38, at 1395. 
 
 96. See supra, text accompanying notes 58–59. 
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practised openly as in the Netherlands, then the effectiveness of all 
legislation has to be questioned. Australian law which prohibits the 
intentional termination of life by an act or omission ‘has not prevented the 
practice of euthanasia or the intentional ending of life without the patient’s 
consent.’ It is equally certain that decriminalising legislation which imposes 
conditions under which voluntary euthanasia may be administered will not 
be complied with. 
  The prevalence of non-voluntary euthanasia [in Australia] is 
attributable not to the ban on voluntary euthanasia but to the faulty exercise 
of a discretion not to prosecute violations of the ban.97  
 
 The logic of this argument is flawed. The evidence that “non-voluntary euthanasia is 
greater where it is illegal as in Australia than where it is practised openly as in the 
Netherlands”98 is equally consistent with the inference that legalization has a beneficial effect 
on the number of cases of non-voluntary euthanasia! Moreover, if the cause of non-voluntary 
euthanasia is the failure to prosecute those who commit it, then perhaps the fact that there 
have been a small number of such prosecutions in the Netherlands could explain the lower 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia there.99  Amarasekara and Bagaric’s analysis also cannot 
explain the low rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in the United Kingdom, another jurisdiction 
in which such prosecutions are rarely brought.100  Indeed, all of these inferences are entirely 
speculative. In order to determine which, if any, of these conclusions is valid, one would need 
to compare the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in a jurisdiction where euthanasia is not 
legalized but is not prosecuted, with one (comparable in other respects) in which cases are 
vigorously prosecuted. No such data exists. 
 
4. Beyond The Rates Of Non-Voluntary Euthanasia 
                                                 
 
 97. Amarasekara and Bagaric, supra note 6, at 191, citing Kuhse, supra note 55, at 
196. See also, Bagaric, supra note 48, at 236–8. 
 
 98. Amarasekara and Bagaric, id. 
 
 99. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 127-36. 
 
 100. See Lewis, id. at 95-7. 
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Although the paucity of the data does not allow us to reach any firm conclusions on the 
empirical slippery slope argument, insights from the survey evidence and other qualitative 
studies may provide evidence that legalization has some benefits in relation to the way in 
which voluntary, non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia occurs, particularly in 
jurisdictions with relatively high apparent rates of covert voluntary and non-voluntary 
euthanasia such as Australia and Belgium.  Roger Magnusson’s study suggests that 
particularly  
disturbing practices, including “botched attempts,” strangulations, and the 
practice of euthanasia in the absence of any prior relationship between 
doctor and patient, are disproportionately evident in countries where 
euthanasia is more difficult to access, and where it defaults to an invisible 
“underground.”101  
 
 If non-voluntary euthanasia is present regardless of legalization, open regulation may 
be preferable to a covert underground.102  There is, for example, evidence showing that the 
presence of consultation with another physician as a safeguard in cases of assisted dying is 
far less likely to be present in jurisdictions which have not legalized.103  Even if appropriate 
baseline-sensitive evidence were to show an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia 
following legalization in a particular jurisdiction, such an increase in an open, regulated 
environment might be preferable to the hidden world of disturbing practices described by 
                                                 
 
 101. Magnusson, supra note 35, at 262. See also, Emanuel, “The Practice of 
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States,” supra note 64, at 509. That 
is not to say that there are no clinical difficulties in jurisdictions which have legalized 
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Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands,” New Engl. J. Med. 342 
(2000): 551–6. 
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 103. Emanuel, “The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
United States,” supra note 64, at 511; Willems, supra note 62, at 67. 
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Magnusson in which “health care workers who perform euthanasia determine the conditions 
for their own involvement.”104  
 Moreover, prohibition may simply encourage doctors to terminate life in ways which 
are more difficult to detect, by using large doses of pain-relieving medications, for example: 
To a considerable extent, a doctor can choose how to bring about a 
shortening of his patient’s life and how to describe what it is that he has 
done. If one of the possibilities is unattractive for any reason, for example 
because it is illegal, he can accomplish the same result in a different way or 
under a different name. To the extent the horribles predicted should 
euthanasia be legalised were already taking place before legalisation but 
were characterised by the responsible doctor as deaths due to abstention or 
pain relief, it is not surprising that legalisation [in the Netherlands] has not 
led to a slippery slope. All that has happened is that what was taking place 
already has to some extent come out into the open as “euthanasia”, where it 
can be subject to some control. For precisely the same reason, no downward 
slippery slope is to be expected in other countries with similar levels of 
physician-negotiated death; they, too, have nowhere to go but up.105 
 
However, the evidence from the pan-European studies does not indicate that those 
jurisdictions with low rates of voluntary euthanasia, assisted suicide and termination of life 
without request have correspondingly higher rates of symptom alleviation with possible life-
shortening effect.106  Thus the advantages of legalization may be less significant in those 
jurisdictions whose baseline rates of covert practices are relatively low. 
                                                 
 
 104. Magnusson, supra note 35, at 4. 
 
 105. Griffiths, supra note 33, at 203. For evidence of this use of pain relieving 
drugs, see Douglas, supra note 62 (36.2% of respondents reported giving pain-relieving drugs 
with the intention of hastening death); Seale, supra note 58, at Table 4 (comparing U.K. and 
New Zealand rates of cases where the intention of intensifying alleviation of pain or 
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the patient’s life was 5.3% (95% CI 4.6%-6.0%); Kuhse, supra note 55, at Box 4.  6.5% of all 
Australian deaths were preceded by the alleviation of pain and suffering through the 
administration of opioids in sufficient doses to hasten death where the decision was partly 
intended to hasten death (no CI provided). 
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IV. Conclusion 
In relation to the empirical slippery slope argument, greater caution is needed before relying 
on the “Dutch experience” when discussing proposals for the regulation of assisted dying in 
other jurisdictions, and the possible consequences of such regulation. There is no evidence 
from the Netherlands that the legalization of voluntary euthanasia caused an increase in the 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. It is possible that post-legalization research in Belgium may 
eventually shed some light on this issue. Evidence in relation to other jurisdictions is mixed: 
while rates of non-voluntary euthanasia in some prohibitive jurisdictions are higher than the 
Dutch rate, in other prohibitive jurisdictions the rates are lower. Lacking solid baseline 
evidence, the current evidence does not support the drawing of inferences either that 
legalization causes an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia or that such rates are 
higher under a prohibitive approach. Furthermore, it seems likely that cultural factors may 
significantly influence baseline rates, thus further decreasing the possibility of drawing 
inferences from evidence in one jurisdiction as to what will happen in another.  
 Judges, commentators, and interest groups have relied on arguments that the Dutch are 
sliding down a slippery slope with little attempt to evaluate the data robustly or to consider 
the effect on such arguments of the vastly different social context. In the absence of evidence 
on the issues of causation and comparability, reliance on the slippery slope argument is 
suspect.  
 Slippery slope arguments often make distinctly unhelpful contributions to debates over 
legalization. It is to be hoped that we can move on from the divisive, polarized arguments 
over alleged abuses which have dominated foreign discussion of euthanasia in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 106. See Seale, id. at Table 3; Van der Heide, supra note 59, at Table 2. In fact, the 
reverse may be true. See the data on Italy and Sweden in Onwuteaka-Philipsen, supra note 
73, at Table 3. 
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Netherlands to take advantage of the open, systematic discussion, “lack[ing] in ideological 
rigidity” which characterizes the Dutch public debate.107  Instead, we should learn from the 
experience in jurisdictions which have legalized assisted dying, while recognizing that 
because of different social contexts and diverse baseline rates of covert practices, those 
experiences do not translate directly to other jurisdictions. 
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